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literature about a number of axioms on the meaning of 'inequality'. They obtained some mixed 
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introudce the role of political attitudes toward income redistribution to clarify the interpretation 
of some results; the questionnaire is enlarged in an attempt to give more room to notions of 
inequality imtermediate between the relative and absolute polar cases; and we provide a 
systematic treatment of the degree of consistency exhibited by the respondents. c 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a recent survey of the field of welfare economics, Hammond (1985) 
has stressed that one of the difficulties of collecting factual information 
about fundamental ethical matters, is that the interpersonal comparisons 
involved are very abstract and remote from the day-to-day decisions of the 
people. However, he expressed some hope that such an abstraction can be 
circunvented by following the approach pioneered by Yaari and Bar-Hillel 
(1982): to confront the population directly with explicit distributional 
judgements, extracting afterwards the implicit interpersonal comparisons or 
value judgements, rather than the other way around. 
In the same vein, Amiel and Cowell (1992) -refered to as AC 
hereafter- have succeeded in eliciting people's views on a number of 
distributional issues relevant to all known attempts to measure economic 
inequality. There are several criteria about the meaning of 'inequality' that 
almost all types of approaches in the literature have in common. Since 
these are central for the making of comparisons of income distributions in a 
useful way, AC maintain that the fact that these criteria are widely held 
among the specialists does not mean that they should pass unchallenged. 
To appreciate the force of their results, we will briefly review the 
intuitive content of the standard axioms under scrutiny. 
(1) Taking for granted what the concepts of 'income' and 'income 
receiver' mean, most practicioners would approve of a condition on 
symmetry or anonymity, which says that if people are identical in all 
relevant characteristics other than income, then inequality comparisons 
should treat them equally, regardless of whom they personally are. 
(2) Usually, inequality rankings are taken to be independent of either 
a simple change in the scale of incomes or the origin from which one 
measures them, giving rise to measures of relative or absolute inequality, 
respectively. As pointed out by Kolm (1976a) in his seminal contribution, 
this is not only a technical question on normalization, but a value-laden 
issue. The fact is that, possibly for historical reasons, for its inherent 
plausibility, and/or because of its technical convenience, the vast majority 
of theoretical papers and more than 95 % of the empirical work deals with 
scale-invariant or relative inequality rankings(l). 
(3) Next, what is known as the Population Principle ensures that 
rankings and inequality measures are invariant under replications of the 
population, opening the way to. the comparison of income distributions 
with a different number of individuals. Such useful implication is certainly 
behind its almost universal acceptance among the specialists. 
(4) The Pigou-Dalton Principle of Transfers is at the core of all existing 
inequality approaches. It states that a small income transfer from a rich to a 
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poor person produces a decrease in inequali ty, no matter what the incomes 
of all the other members of the population might be. 
(5) Finally, an assumption which permits a decomposition of 
inequality by population subgroups has been widely investigated for its 
convenience in empirical applications. But combined with the rest of the 
axioms already presented, it has somewhat surprising and drastic 
implications: the classes of relative, absolute or intermediate inequality 
measures, gets reduced in each case to a single parametric family of 
decomposable indices, where the parameter which identifies each member 
of the family is interpreted as an indicator of the degree of aversion to 
inequalit/2). 
Armed with these or similar axioms, anyone can claim that income 
inequality in one situation, place or period is higher or lower than in 
another. Thus, as AC indicate "Statements of this sort are commonly taken 
to be a yardstick of economic performance; they sometimes provide a basis 
for social comment; and it has been knmvn for policy-makers to act upon 
them." Which is why they decided to perform an experimental test to 
investigate whether people's opinions tend to corroborate the general 
consensus found in the literature about the above standard assumptions. 
The experiment confronted a group of 1.108 students, from eight 
colleges and universities in four countries, with a carefully designed 
questionnaire organized in two parts: a nUlTlerical section, containing a set 
of simple choices between succesive pairs of specific income distributions; 
and a verbal section, in \·vhich respondents have to choose among several 
alternative views about the effect on inequality of hypothetical changes in 
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the income distribution. The issues raised in the second section are closely 
linked to the numerical questions in the first; and to allow for the 'learning 
by doing' that takes place as one proceeds through the experiment, during 
the second part respondents are given the opportunity to change their 
original answers to the numerical questions. 
College students were considered as an appropiate 'target' sub-
population for a number of reasons. In particular, given the nature of the 
questionnaire -whose Spanish and English versions are in Appendix 1- they 
were chosen as a compromise bet\·veen the narrow specialist and the well-
meaning but innumerate layman. 
The questionnaire refers to all the axioms examined, except 
anonymity which could not be easily integrated in this context. According to 
AC, the results are mixed: 
i) On the one hand, there is clear support for the principle of 
population, as well as for the following broad interpretation of 'the 
conventional view' on the admissible normalization rule: 'inequality 
judgements should respect either the scale-invariance principle, or the 
)translation-invariance, or should conform to some intermediate position 
between the two.' However, in both cases there was a significant dissenting 
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minority which could not be completely dismissed as providing merely 
unperceptive or unreasoning replies. 
ii) With regard to the remaining two axioms that play such an 
important part in the logic and structure of inequality measures, there 
appear to be greater difficulties. Respondents were split almost down the 
middle on whether it is possible to decompose inequality. More 
controversially, a solid majority did not appear to agree with the transfer 
principle, as it is usually expressed. 
iii) As it is well known(3), anonymity, scale-invariance, the 
population principle, and the transfer principle completely characterizes the 
usual Lorenz quasi-ordering. The replacement of scale-invariance by other 
notions of inequality lead to analogous dominance criteria(4). But when the 
authors test for systems of axioms, they find that there is a very low 
agreement with the usual Lorenz ordering, both numerically and verbally 
(14 and 20 %, respectively). The addition of the decomposition axiom, which 
leads to the Generalized Entropy family of relative inequality measures, 
lowers the percentage of approval to only a 9 % of the sample. On the other 
hand, AC find even less support (6 or 13 %) for the concept of absolute 
Lorenz domination. 
We do not plan to discuss here the difficult decisions made by AC in 
relation to the target population and the questionnaire. It suffices to say that 
we believe in the interest of the general approach; we also confess to be at 
least as impressed as the authors with some of the unconventional results, 
although we are not always in complete agreement with their interpretation 
or the lessons they obtained from them. Therefore, what we propose is to 
replicate the exercise with Spanish subjects in order to write a companion 
paper within the same framework. In so doing, we would like to offer 
something novel in relation to the following three points. 
(A) We believe that it is useful to distinguish between two different 
value judgements: a person's attitude towards the extent of income 
redistribution she is prepared to demand and/or accept for actual 
implementation in her own society, and the invariance concept of 
inequality in the event of changes in total income embodied in her ranking 
over income vectors. As we will see, we are not certain which of these two 
issues is addressed by AC's questions on scale and translation invariance. 
Also, we shall suggest the enlargement of the questionnaire in an attempt to 
give a greater chance to people's views about notions of inequality 
intermediate between the relative and absolute polar cases. Finally, we will 
offer an alternative diagnosis of the ethical and practical problems involved 
in this aspect of inequality measurement. 
(B) As Sen (1973) warned long ago, inequality as a notion does not 
have any innate property of completeness. However, the questionnaire does 
not leave any room for it. What it does is, for each issue, to offer two 
alternative routes to the respondent, one numerical and one verbal, plus 
the opportunity to rectify as one goes along. Thus, it should come as no 
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surprise that people's answers show different degrees of consistency, a 
question raised by AC but that, in our opinion, deserves more attention and 
a systematic treatment which fully exploits the interrelationships present in ) 
the questionnaire. 
(C) In view of the serious departures from the conventional 
professional view, AC observe in the concluding section that it would be 
interesting to know more about the connection between people's cultural Ji 
and intellectual background and their perceptions of economic inequality. 
With this aim in mind, in a sample of 393 individuals we have included 
college students of different fields (244 students of Economics at the 
Universities of Alicante, Bilbao, Zaragoza, and Complutense of Madrid, as I 
well as 33 students of Industrial Engeneering and 11 of Psicology from the - I )
University of Madrid), 86 professors of Economics from the above 
Universities, and 19 persons working at the trade union Comisiones 
Obreras. Also, we kept a brief record of personal characteristics of the 
respondents which includes the sex and the educational background of their 
parents. ) 
The rest of the paper is organized in four sections. Section 11 develops 
our argument in favor of certain modifications of the experiment. Section 
III reports the empirical results on each of the individual axioms, while 
Section IV presents the results on systems of axioms and the influence of 
cultural and other factors. Section V offers some conclusions. 
) 
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11. MODIFICAnONS OF THE EXPERIMENT 
n.l. Politics and the invariance question 
It would be very convenient if we all had a notion of inequality 
independent of efficiency considerations. Then, among other things, we 
would be able to separate changes in total income from distributional 
changes, and we will have no difficulty providing answers to questions of 
the following sort: suppose we are given an allocation s (the status-quo) of a 
total income 5 among the n members of a population, as well as a different 
total 5'; then with which criterion should we select a distribution s' of the 
new total so that it has the same inequality as s? 
An illustration is provided in Figure 1 for the two person case. Under 
anonymity, we can restrict our attention to the subset of the non-negative 
orthant to the left of the 45 degrees line. The segment CD contains all 
possible allocations of a total income 5' greater than the quantity S = sl + s2 
associated with the status quo s. 
c 
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Figure 1 
All distributions along the ray R(s) exhibit the same relative 
inequality as s. While all those along the ray A(s), like s" where the amount 
,6,5 = 5' - 5 is distributed in equal per capita quantities, have the same 
absolute inequality as s. To the left of s', the rich person would receive a 
larger proportion of ,6,5 than the poor, whereas to the right of s" the poor 
5 
.J 
would get a greater absolute quantity than the rich. Both of these proposals 
are rather extreme, but any linear combination between s' and sit or, more 
generally, between the rays R(s) and A(s), give rise to more reasonable 
intermediate inequality concepts. Let us identify all 'acceptable' distribution 
rules by a parameter A in the interval [0,1], with the rays R(s) and A(s) 
obtaining for A=1 and 0, respectively. 
Of course, the choice of A, that is, the choice of a concept of inequality 
invariant to changes in total income, involves a value judgement. Consider 
distribution B in Figure 1: as long as less inequality is prefered to more, for 
values of Aclose to 1 society is better off at B than at s, but the opposite is the 
case for values close to 0 which represent a more demanding or more 
egalitarian point of view. 
Just to appreciate the subtelty of the options involved, consider the 
ways in which the decision may depend on circumstances not yet spelled 
out: 
i) Individuals may have different views about the appropiate A 
depending on whether we face an increase in total income relative to s, 
arising, for instance, from economic growth, or a decrease in total income 
because of the need to collect an income tax. 
ii) As illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, history may matter. Firstly, 
depending on how unequal the initial situation is, the cones spanned by the 
R and A rays through s or t in Figure 2 are very different. Thus, for instance, 
for all A in [0,1] the distribution E is simultaneously more unequal than s 
but less so than t. 
Secondly, in judging the situation F in Figure 3, which distribution, s 
or t, is taken as the origin at rather different levels of total income, has 
different implications: for some intermediate value of A, sand F exhibit the 
same inequality, while for all values of A the distribution F has less 
inequality than t. This example illustrates the potencial importance of the 
level of affluence from which we judge, as well as a slightly different point: 
a large hypothetical increase in total income, as in the comparison between s 
and F, or a small one, as in going from t to F, may lead to a different 
inequality assesment. 
Possibly, to avoid the obvious complications derived from allowing 
inequality judgements to depend on information other than the pair of 
income vectors under comparison, the existing literature rules out such 
considerations altogether. AC do not investigate the dependence of people's 
notion of inequality on the location or the total income of the original 
position. But they attempt to test whether people behave differently in view 
of hypothetical increases or decreases of total income. In any case, we believe 
that they face two types of difficulties: some arising from the way politics 
might influence people's answers; and some arising from the specific form 
of their questions on this matter. 
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We suggest that, in this context, it is useful to identify political views 
with attitudes towards redistribution, measured or manifested by the extent 
by which one is prepared to depart from proportionality. Thus, we claim 
that if the economy, say, is growing, those more inclined to the left of the 
political spectrum will find socially desirable to move along a ray well to the 
right of R(s). More conservative people would accept minor departures in 
that direction, or would even tolerate movements along a ray somewhat to 
the left of R(s), which imply that, although the poor would improve in 
absolute terms, the rich would gain more than in proportion to the share 
they enjoyed at the status quo (5). We believe also that political attitudes are 
affected by the nature of the initial position: the more unequal is the status 
quo, the greater the acceptance of larger redistributions in favor of the poor. 
On the other hand, everybody that accepts a progressive income tax 
would accept a downward movement from the initial position along a ray 
to the right of R(s), and therefore beyond the range of admissible values for 
A. At the other extreme, very few people would recommend that taxes 
should be paid in equal absolute amounts along the ray A(s). A plausible 
explanation for this, is that any politically sensible person has a different 
approach on how to distribute the fruits of growth or the income tax. 
Notice that attitudes towards redistribution embody a value 
judgement logically (and politically) distinct from the choice of an 
appropiate A. However, it may be difficult for people to distinguish between 
them or, perhaps, there is a natural association between political orientation 
and preferences for A. Thus, we would expect that, when total income is 
increasing, the more radical a person is, the lower the A she would prefer. At 
least, this seems to be the intuition behind Kolm's (l976a) suggestion that 
measures of relative (or absolute) inequality could be termed rightist 
(respectively, leftist). The problem is that, although AC's questions are 
presumably a device to learn about people's choice of A, the answers will be 
influenced by their attitudes to redistribution as well as their views on the 
appropiate value of that parameter. 
Going now into the specific form of the AC questions on this matter, 
we need to make the following comments. They considered only the two 
cases corresponding to A equal to 1 or 0 by means of 2 numerical and 2 
verbal questions (questions 1 and 2, and 5 and 6, respectively, in our 
questionnaire). However, the change in total income in the two numerical 
questions was not of the same magnitude. 
A priori, we believed that strong egalitarians with a preference for A = 
owere rare, and more likely to show up if the increase in total income was 
smaller in question 2 than in question 1. Because of this, and to facilitate the 
comparison with AC's experiment, we thought that it was acceptable to 
maintain such an asymmetry between the first two numerical questions. On 
the other hand, in an attempt to free the respondents on the usual 
concentration on the polar cases, we thought that it was worth while to offer 
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a third, intermediate choice by means of questions 3 and 7. To provide a 
sharp test with the standard notion of relative inequality, we made the 
change in total income in question 3 as close as possible to that of question 1. 
11.2. The question of consistency 
As mentioned in the Introduction, inequality rankings need not be 
complete. Alternatively, people may have fuzzy views about some of the 
issues, rather than the precision presupposed in the experiment. For these 
and, perhaps, other reasons, being forced to provide clear cut answers to 
intriguing ethical questions is not an easy matter, as anybody can verify by 
simply going through the questionnaire. Just the comparison of 3-
dimensional vectors might be hard for many people, which is why AC 
always include a verbal section for each topic, as well as the opportunity to 
rectify the original answers to the numerical questions. 
Given this structure, as soon as we consider two (or more) questions 
on the same topic, there exists the possibility of studying the degree of 
consistency shown by the respondents. This should be particularly advisable 
in those instances detected by AC -and confirmed in the Spanish case- in 
which the frequency distribution of the answers to the verbal section differs 
significantly from the numerical one. 
The interest of this systematic effort is twofold. Firstly, were we to 
detect a large degree of inconsistency, we would had to conclude that the 
respondents lacked a clear view of the issues or, more likely, that the 
framing chosen was a poor vehicle to elicit the people's views on these 
elusive matters. Secondly, there is an obvious interest in finding out 
whether there is or not an association between the absence of self 
contradiction and a higher (or lower) degree of agreement with the 
traditional views upheld in the economic literature. 
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Ill. RESULTS: THE INDIVIDUAL AXIOMS 
111.1. The invariance issue 
Recall that the first group of questions refer to the effects on 
inequality of certain redistributions of a greater total income by means of 
numerical comparisons for a population of three persons. In question 1 
distribution B is formed by doubling the incomes in distribution A; in 
question 2 distribution B results from an addition of 4 units to each of the 
incomes in distribution A; and in question 3 distribution B is formed by 
adding 6 units to everyone and distributing 10 more according to the 
original shares. These questions correspond to a value of A. =1, 0 or 5/14, 
respectively. In either case, the question is: under transformation A-.+B does 
inequality go down, up, or stays the same? 
To facilitate the comparison with AC's experiment, we shall start 
with questions 1 and 2 (ql and q2), as well as with the corresponding verbal 
counterparts (q5 and q6). The simple tabulations are given in Table 1, while 
the cross-tabulations for the whole sample are given in Tables 2 and 3, 
respectively(6). 
TAB L El: simple tabulations 
Double lrrgrre (q 1) Add 6 units (q2) 
N Down Up SaIre Down Up SaIre 
% % % % % % 
AIL 393 13 43 44 60 8 31 
AC 1.108 14 35 51 59 9 31 
Double trrone (q5) Add fixed Stn11 (ep) 
N Down Up SaIre Down Up SaIre 
% % % % % % 
AIL 393 14 51 34 66 5 30 
AC 1.108 12 40 47 58 6 35 
TAB L E 2: numerlcal questions 
------------------------------------Add6~-~f--------------
Do.vn Up Same 
% % % 
Double income (ql) Down 11 (8) 1 (2) 2 (5) 
Up 19 (15) 4 (3) 19 (17)** 
Same 30 (37)* 3 (5) 10 (9) 
10 
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TAB LE 3: velbal questions 
-----------------------------------Addf~sum-~6)-------------
DcMn Up Saxre 
% % % 
DQuble InCQme (q5) Down 11 (7) 0.5 (1) 3 (4) 
Up 30 (21) 3 (2) 18 (17)** 
Same 25 (30)* 1 (3) 8.5 (9) 
Clearly, these last two tables, where the numbers in parentheses 
correspond to AC's results, are the relevant ones. The position of a person 
who believes in scale-invariance (respectively, translation-invariance) is 
marked with a single (double) arterisk. In our opinion, the group answering 
that inequality goes up when all incomes are doubled, and down when 
equal amounts are added to everyone, are perfectly respectable 
'intermediate' people. Furthermore, those answering that inequality goes 
down, or up, in both situations, can be called 'right-extremists' or 'left-
extremists', respectively. 
Notice that, contrary to what AC state, in both samples respondents 
seem to be influenced by whether the questions were presented in 
numerical or verbal form. Those supporting a relative inequality concept go 
down, those in favor of an absolute notion remain the same, and those in 
c between go up: 
ACsample Spanish sample 
Relative AbsQlute Intermediate SUM Relative AbsQlute Intermediate SUM 
% % % % % % % % 
Numerical 37 17 15 69 30 19 19 68 
Verbal 30 17 21 68 25 18 30 73 
We think that this result justifies introducing questions 3 and 7, and 
worrying explicitly about the degree of consistency shown by the 
respondents when we consider all the questions simultaneously. Tables 4A 
and 4B present the cross classification by type of inequality concept and the 
degree of consistency as defined in Appendix 2. 
TABLE 4A 
Type Qf ineQuality 
Rela tive AbsQlute Intermediate Ext. right Ext.left Other ALL 
% % % % % % % 
CQnsistens;y 
Maximum. 47 30 6 50 20 31 
,-
'- Good 19 36 79 15 20 38 
Acceptable 16 28 2 30 47 18 
Minimum 2 2 12 6 13 6 
Unacceptable 15 4 1 100 7 
ALL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1 1 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE 4B 
Type of inequality J': 
I 
Relative Absolute Intermediate Ext. right Ext.left Other ALL 
% % % % % % % 
Consistency 
Maximum 49 22 5 22 2 100 
Good 16 21 55 5 2 100 ~) I 
Minimum 13 9 57 13 9 100 
Unacceptable 70 15 4 11 100 
ALL 32 23 27 14 4 1 100 
IA high percentage, 87 %, of the Spanish sample show at least an " 
acceptable degree of consistency. A considerable amount, 22 % of the total 
sample, exhibited 'good' or 'maximum' consistency after making use of the 
opportunity for rectification. The fact that 'intermediate' persons exhibit in 
great numbers 'good' rather than 'maximum' consistency is understandable 
because only those that accept precisely the value A= 5/14 are classified at ) 
the top of that scale. 'Right-extremists' seem to be rather consistent, but this 
is not the case with 'left-extremists'; this may indicate that only the first of 
these two residual groups is really meaningful. 
When we restrict ourselves to the 344 persons that show at least an 
acceptable degree of consistency, the distribution, from right to left of the 
political spectrum, is the following: 
Extreme-right Relative Intermediate Absolute Extreme-left 
15 % 31 % 27% 24% 4% ) 
Thus, 82 % of them -or 71 % of the total sample- support an acceptable view 
on the effect of income transformations, including a relative, an absolute or 
an intermediate notion of inequality. On the other hand, only 4 % of the 
consistent respondents are classified as 'extreme-left', a group whose I, ) 
coherence deserves further examination. 
AC develop an interesting analysis of people's reactions to increases 
versus decreases in individual incomes in the second part of q6, which 
allows to collect evidence on the question: will the removal of one unit 
.) 
from everybody have exactly the opposite effect on inequality from that 
brought about by the addition of one unit? They assert that for those 
answering 'yes' to this question, which are said to be 'reverse consistent', 
neither history nor other considerations different from the pair of income 
vectors with which one is confronted does matter. They report that 80 % of 
their sample exhibit this kind of consistency(7). They seem to imply that we 
should be satisfied since this is the convention adopted in the academic 
literature. 
We suggest a different interpretation of their results. We claim that ) i 
the only sensible answer to the second part of q6, no matter your political 
12 
------------------------------------------------------------
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persuasion, is that inequality goes up when the same amount is deducted 
from everybody's income (the poll-tax case). In AC's Table 6, 65 % of the 
sample are sensible in this sense. The problem is that, in a clear case of 
confusion between political and technical points of view, 53 % of the sample 
are, simultaneously, (politically) sensible and reverse consistent in AC 
sense; of course, they are the 'relative' or 'intermediate' persons who have 
no difficulty in recognizing a politically regressive proposition when they 
see one. We must conclude that to discriminate between these two 
interpretations further research is needed. 
111.2. Population replication 
Exactly as in AC's work, we investigated respondents' views on this 
principle with one numerical question (q4) and one verbal question (q8). In 
each case respondents were invited to consider the effect on inequality of 
replicating the population. The summary of responses to both of them is 
given in Table 5. 
TABLE IS 
Nt.nrertpl (q4) ~ (q8) 
N Down Up Sarre Down Up same 
% % % % % % 
393 28 12 60 20 16 64-
1.108 31 10 58 22 9 66 
More interesting is the information on the consistency of the answers 
to the two questions, according to the definition provided in Appendix 2. 
The cross tabulation of this concept and the degree of approval of the 
principle itself is presented in Table 6. 
TABLE 6 
A 91 % of people display maximum consistency, 13 % after rectifying 
their original numerical answer. Among the consistent persons, 66 % agree 
with the principle. What is at variance with the academic consensus is that 
34 % of the consistent people -or 31 % of the total sample- disagrees with it. 
Notice, however, that, among the inconsistent responses, those disagreeing 
represent a large mayority: 68 %. 
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On the other hand, as might be expected, 94 % of the respondents 
with a good or better degree of consistency in relation to the invariance 
issue show a maximum of consistency here. Only 'left-extremists' disagree 
with the axiom well above the average for the sample: 60 % of them versus 
37 % for the population as a whole. 
111.3. Transfer principle 
As AC indicate, this is a place where one has to be very careful about 
what one means. Since the numerical question (q9) involves 5-dimensional 
vectors, it has been possible to consider a 'progressive' transfer between 
adjacent incomes which do not affect neither the poorest nor the richest 
persons. If people maintain that distribution B -after the transfer- is more 
unequa 1 than A, then we take this as strong disagreement; however, 
contrary to AC, if they regard A and B as equivalent, we do not think that 
the disagreement is milder but rather of a different kind. The verbal 
question (q12) provides a very clear statement of the principle; thus, 
following AC, if respondents pick answer (b) -that is, essentially "don't 
know"- we should take this as strong disagreement with the principle. 
However, answer (c) -"none of the above"- logically means that inequality 
went up or remained constant; in our opinion, this reflects a disagreement 
of a different sort, consistent, by the way, with alternatives 'B' and 'A and B' 
in q9. The results, in the form of simple tabulations to both questions, are in 
Table 7. 
TABLE 7 
Nurnert:a1 (q9) ~(q12) 
N Agree Disagr-1 Disagr-2 Agree Disagr-1 Disagr-2 
% % % % % % 
AlL 393 54 22 24 57 37 6 
AC 1.108 35 42 22 60 24 14 
Notice that, in the Spanish sample, the turn around in the answers 
from the numerical to the verbal question is rather different than in the AC 
case: from 54 to 57 % of agreement with the principle but 22 to 37 % of 
disagreement of the first type. Out of the 16 % which take the opportunity of 
rectifying the original answer to q9, a mayority turns to accepting the axiom. 
This is again a place in which an explicit notion of consistency, as the one 
offered in the Appendix 2, may help to understand better the results of the 
experiment. 
Table 8 presents the cross tabulation of such a notion together with 
the degree of agreement with the axiom. Notice that only 22 % of the 
sample were utterly inconsistent. On the other hand, 54 % agree with the 
transfer principle; among them, 89 % (or 48 % of the total sample) show 
maximum consistency, and the rest an acceptable degree of it. In this respect, 
recall that AC report that only 36 % of the respondents were prepeared to 
1 4 
) 
. ) 
. ) 
) 
) 
----------------------------------------------------
accept the axiom both when expressed in the example and when stated 
verbally. However, as much as 24 % of the Spanish sample disagree with the 
principle; they split down the middle between maximum or acceptable 
consistency and, therefore, their opinions cannot be dismissed lightly. 
TABL E 8 
Degree of consistency Degree of consistency 
Maximum Acceptable Unaccept. Maximum Acceptable Unaccept. ALL 
% % % % % % % 
Transfer pIe. 
Agree 89 11 81 31 54 
Disagree-Type 1 44 56 7 27 9 
Disagree-Type 2 47 53 12 42 15 
Neither lOO 100 22 
ALL 59 19 22 100 100 100 100 
It might be interesting to note that there is a high correlation between 
the degree of consistency here and the corresponding concept for the 
invariance question. Also, as illustrated in Table 9, it turns out that 
supporters of relative or intermediate concepts of inequality tend to accept 
also the principle of transfers. Surprisingly enough, those attached to an 
absolute notion of inequality and, above all, left-extremists are 
disproportionally represented both among the inconsistent and among 
those against this 'progressive' principle; probably, this means that the last 
political denomination is a misnomer for a residual group which has 
trouble following the experiment. 
TABLE 9 
Type of ineguality 
Relative Absolute Intermediate Ext. right Ext.left ALL 
% % % % % % 
Transfer Principle 
Agree 60 43 60 50 33 54 
Disagree 24 30 20 26 20 24 
Neither 17 27 20 24 47 22 
111.4. Decomposability 
Following AC, to investigate whether there is a consensus view on 
decomposability by population subgroups three questions were used: if 
respondents gave the same rankings in each of the two numerical questions 
(q10 and qll), we take this as (weak) agreement with the principle. The 
results are given in Table ID, where the answers to the verbal question (q13) 
are also included. 
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TABL E 10 
----------------------N~(qloandqllf---------,,~~(ql~------ ) 
N Same Different Agree 
% % % 
.AIL 393 68 32 43 
PC 1.108 57 41 40 
Dtsagr-1 Dtsagr-2 
% % 
52 5 
45 11 
~) 
Notice that 68 % of the sample, of which 6 % comes once rectification 
is allowed, agree with the principle when tested in numerical form (versus 
57 % in the AC experiment). The affirmative answers in the verbal question 
are less numerous in both samples: 43 % and 40 % in the Spanish and the 
AC case, respectively. The cross tabulation of both sections for the Spanish 
group is as follows: 
Numerical part 
(qlO, qll) 
Agree 
Disagree 
TABLE 11 
Agree 
% 
35 
lOu 
Verbal part(q13) 
Disagree-l 
% 
25 
]6-
Disagree-2 
% 
')8 .... 
5-
We suggest that the cases marked with a single arterisk, which 
amount to 21 % of the sample, can be taken to disagree inequivocally with 
the axiom. The responses in the slots with a double arterisk, 18 % of the 
totat show instead a contradictory opinion. A 35 % of the people express a 
consistent agreement, and the remaining 25 % can be considered to show 
only a weak disagreement. 
) 
) 
111.5. Welfare independence 
Consider a pair of transfers of the same amount but opposite sign: a 
progresive transfer at the lower end of the distribution, and a regresive one 
at the upper end of it. According to the independence axiom first suggested 
by Kolm <l976a,b)(8) inequality should go down. Since the alternative B in 
q10 and qll is obtained from the alternative A by means of a pair of such 
transfers, we may use them for an indirect test of the support this axiom has 
in the Spanish sample. 
) 
) 
We know already that 267 persons, or 68 % of the sample, gave the 
same answer to questions q10 and qll. But only 126, or 32 % of the total, 
thought that alternative B showed less inequality than alternative A in both 
situations, in agreement with this last axiom. From another point of view, 
answer B was chosen in q10 and q11 by 45 and 42 % of the respondents, 
) 
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respectively; but this support declined to the quoted 32 % when both 
questions were considered together. 
To test the strength of the conviction, or the consistency, of such 
percentage of people in apparent agreement with this axiom, we searched 
for those of them who accepted also the simple transfer principle. Only 66 
persons, or about 17 % of the sample, seemed to accept both axioms 
simultaneously. However, it is clear that this issue deserves further 
investigation which, among other things, should include a verbal statement 
of the problem. 
17 
) 
I 
IV. FURTHER RESULTS 
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IV.t. Relations among axioms 
First of all, how many people provide consistent answers to all of the J!following: the invariance issue, the population principle and the transfer 
principle? In relation to the population principle, the respondents were 
originally classified as exhibiting an acceptable (value 1) or an unacceptable 
(value 0) degree of consistency. Let us dichotomize the answers to the 
transfer principle giving a value of 1 to all persons having an acceptable or :J
maximum degrees of consistency, and a value of 0 to the rest. With respect 
to the invariance issue, we will give a value of 2 to people with a maximum 
or good degree of consistency, a value of 1 to those with an acceptable or 
minimum showing, and a value of 0 to those whose consistency was 
classified as unacceptable. Then, a useful definition of 'joint consistency' 
may differenciate among the following categories: 
Invariance Population pIe. Transfer pIe. 
2 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Toint consistency 
Maximum x x x 
Good x x x 
Minimum (x or x) x x 
Rest (either or -) x 
) 
Thus, a person will be classified in the two lowest categories if she is 
inconsistent in her responses to the principle of transfers, althoug in the 
'minimum' case she would have an acceptable record as far as the two other 
axioms are concerned. The only difference between the first two categories is 
. ) 
the degree of consistency shown with respect to the invariance issue. The 
distribution of the sample is as follows: 
Toint consistency Number of people Percenta&e in % 
Maximum 2(8 53 / \ 
Good 57 15 
Minimum 71 17 
Rest 57 15 
Since 84 persons, or 22 % of the sample, exhibited an unacceptable 
degree of consistency with regard to the transfer principle, the remaining 10 
% which fails to reach the upper categories must show minimum or below 
minimurn consistency in either of the two other axioms. 
. )
On the other hand, as much as 68 % of the sample, or 265 people, are 
classified with a good or maximum degree of joint consistency. On the 
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grounds that this last population group includes those whom we can 
presume that truly understood the questions posed, we want to know 
whether their answers differ sistematicaUy from the rest of the sample. If we 
label these 265 persons as 'consistent', and the remaining 128 as 
'inconsistent', the distribution of their answers to the different issues are as 
follows: 
Consistent 
% 
Inconsistent 
% 
Consistent 
% 
Inconsistent 
% 
Invariance issue 
Relative 
Absolute 
Intermediate 
Rest 
Transfer pIe. 
Agree 
Other 
32 
22 
29 
17 
50 
50 
32 
23 
23 
21 
23 
67 
Population pIe. 
Agree 
Disagree 
Descomponibili ty 
Agree 
Weak disagr. 
Other 
66 
34 
37 
27 
36 
58 
42 
31 
20 
48 
Only the transfer principle turns out to be much more acceptable 
among the consistent people. With regard to the other axioms the 
differences are not large. Nevertheless, as expected, in every case the views 
expressed by the consistent subsample are closer to the consensus 
maintained in the academic literature. 
Finally, what is the behavior of the Spanish sample with regard to 
systems of axioms? Only 109 persons -or 130 if extreme-rightists are 
included- accept simultaneously a relative (52), an absolute (25) or an 
intermediate (32) invariance concept, as well as the principle of population 
and the principle of transfers. As many as 98 of them, plus the 21 extreme 
rightists, are also jointly-consistent. The frequency distributions of these two 
types of people, the sample as a whole, and the AC sample are as follows: 
Consistent Inconsistent Whole sample ACsample 
% % % % 
Lorenz dominance 
Relative 8 4 13 14 - 20 
Absolute 8 3 6 6-13 
Intermediate 11 2 8 ? 
Extreme-right 8 5 ? 
Rest 55 91 67 ? 
Among those 98 persons -or 27 % of the total sample- who accept a 
relative, absolute or intermediate Lorenz dominance criterion, only 71 
accept in addition the descomponibility axiom or are mildly against it. That 
is, 18 % of the total sample, or only 13 % if we require also joint-consistency. 
Half of them, namely, 9 % of the total, support a relative view of inequality 
and, therefore, without knowing it, the Generalized Entropy family of 
inequality measures. Exactly the same percentage reported by AC in this 
matter. 
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IV.2. Cultural influences 
How do the Spanish respondents compare with the population from 
Germany, Israel and the V.S. studied by AC? In Tables 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 10 we 
have reported the frequency distributions of the two samples for a number 
of questions common to both experiments. Given the sample sizes 
involved and a casual inspection of the evidence, it should come as no 
surprise that the differences observed are statistically significant. However, 
given the large cultural distance between the two populations, we are quite 
impressed by the similarities encountered: 
- The sum of supporters of a relative, absolute or intermediate view 
of inequality, as well as the degree of acceptance of the population principle, 
are practically the same in both samples. 
- In spite of the fact that there is a considerable difference in the degree 
of acceptance of the transfer principle -which is greater in the Spanish 
sample- it is truly remarkable that the small degree of acceptance of the 
Lorenz criteria in the two versions for which the comparison is possible, is 
of the same order of magnitude. Moreover, when we add the 
decomposibility axiom, a comparable decline of support is observed in both 
cases. 
Do personal characteristics play a role in the pattern of responses? For 
the Spanish sample we have information on the sex of the respondent and 
the educational achivement of their parents. We have chosen joint-
consistency and the Lorenz criteria (for absolute, intermediate, relative and 
extreme-right notions of inequality) as the variables to be explained. The )
frequency distributions are as follows: 
JOINT-CONSISTENCY LORENZ 
Sample Max. Good Min. Rest Agree Reject 
size % % % % % % 
SEX 
Male 2~ 53 15 16 15 34 66 
Female 185 52 14 21 14 32 68 
EDUCATION 
Higher 140 60 14 17 9 41 59 
High School 64 45 14 19 22 30 70 
Lower 189 50 15 19 16 29 71 
TYPE 
)Econ student 244 50 15 20 16 28 72 
Other student 44 48 23 16 14 36 64 
Trade unionist 19 42 32 26 37 67 
Econ professor 86 67 6 13 14 45 55 
ALL 393 53 15 18 15 33 67 
20 
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Notice that the small subsamples of trade unionists and non-
economic students provided similar answers, which were not that different 
from those of the larger group of economic students. Economic professors, 
however, showed greater consistency and closer agreement with the 
received view established by their coleagues in the field of inequality. 
We found some correlation between EDUCATION and TYPE, and we 
wanted to make sure that SEX had no explanatory power. Thus, we 
estimated a logit model for JOINT-CONSISTENCY and LORENZ, in which 
'other students' and 'trade unionists' were aggregated into a single group. 
The results of the maximum likelihood analysis of variance were as 
follows: 
JOINT-CONSISTENCY LORENZ 
Source DF Chi-Square Prob DF Chi-Square Prob 
INTERCEPT 3 89.86 0.00 1 18.54 0.00 . 
SEX 3 2.62 0.45 1 0.08 0.78 
EDUCATION 6 7.98 0.24 2 4.07 0.13 
TYPE 6 15.36 0.02 2 7.02 0.02 
Likelihood ratio 36 32.38 0.64 12 13.97 0.30 
" \.... 
It is confirmed that SEX has no influence, that TYPE matters in a 
predictable way, and that EDUCATION has little influence in the presence 
of TYPE. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
1. This type of questionnaire is not easy to respond, if only because 
people may have fuzzy and/or incomplete views on a concept with so many 
facets as income inequality. Nevertheless, a large majoriry of the Spanish 
sample provided consistent answers to the numerical and verbal parts of 
the normalization issue (87 %), the population principle (91 %), or the 
transfer principle (78 %). In so doing, a considerable number of individuals 
took advantage of the opportunity to rectify their original answers to the 
numerical questions. Moreover, it should be emphasized that 68 % of the 
sample maintained acceptable consistency when the three sets of questions 
were considered simultaneously. 
2. In spite of the cultural and occupational diversity among the 
participants in the two experiments, with the exception of the transfer 
principle the response patterns were not utterly different from those 
obtained in the AC case. On the other hand, within the Spanish sample, the 
multivariate analysis showed that the group to which one belonged 
mattered, but the parents educational background or the sex of the 
respondents exercised a small or no influence whatsoever. 
In our opinion, these two conclusions show that one need not 
abandon this experimental approach because large numbers of people could 
not cope with the complexities of the issues as expressed in the 
questionnaire, or because of the huge and/or unexplained variability of the 
response patterns due to cultural differences. 
3. What aspects of the actual answers should cause us some concern? 
To begin with, that only 32 % of the sample support a relative view of 
inequality should not be a problem at all. If the vast majority of specialists 
prefer this notion for technical or other reasons, and because of the 
influence of political attitudes to redistribution or other unkown concerns 
people in large numbers declare to favor instead absolute or intermediate 
versions of inequality, then perhaps it is time to change the consensus and 
use more often other notions of inequality as Kolm (1976a,b) and Bossert 
and Pfingsten (1990), for example, have recommended. 
What might give us some pause is that, even within the jointly 
consistent subsample, 34 % disagree with the population principle, while 50 
% rejects the transfer principle. Also, 21 % of the total sample show an 
unequivocal disagreement with the possibility of decomposing inequality, 
while an additional 25 % manifest a weak disagreement with it. Finally, like 
in the AC case, the percentage of people supporting the different Lorenz 
criteria is very small, and much smaller still if, in addition, decomposability 
is required. 
One cannot escape the conclusion that the four axioms discussed, 
which are usually taken for granted by the academic specialists, are not 
obvious at all for important segments of the two experimental groups. 
However, there is some qualifying evidence: the jointly inconsistent people 
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-which represent a 32 % of the Spanish sample- reject much more often the 
transfer principle (67 % versus 50 %), and the Lorenz criteria (91 % versus 
55 %) than those with a good or maximum degrees of joint consistency. 
4. We would like to gain a better understanding of the reasons for the 
discrepancies with the received view: do people fail to agree in greater 
numbres because of firm ethical views which deserve further investigation 
by the specialists, or would they change their answers if they were exposed 
to a full explanation of the axioms in question and the practical 
consequences of its rejection? 
On the other hand, we would like to know more about people's 
views on other aspects discussed in Section Il in relation to the type of 
inequality one adscribes to: does the initial position matter? are there 
differences when one considers decreases versus increases in total income? 
do large versus small changes in total income induce different responses? 
Other properties of inequality measures, like the independence axiom 
briefly treated in Section IlLS, or the distributional homotheticity discussed 
by Blackorby and Donaldson (1978), could be taken up also in other 
experiments. 
In the meanwhile, the simple fact that in this area little is purely 
technical -and most is essentially political- could be taken deeper at heart by 
the profession. Following the authorized voice of Atkinson (1989), we ought 
to follow procedures and, above all, report empirical estimates, making clear 
their dependence on the various axioms involved. Whether inequality 
went up or down under the null hypothesis that the current consensus 
among the specialists commands universal approval, is less interesting than 
to know, precisely, under what set of value judgements inequality did 
indeed change. 
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NOTES 
(1) Besides Kolm (1976a,b), Blackorby and Donaldson (1980) and 
Bossert and Pfingsten (1990) are fundamental references on absolute and 
intermediate inequality measures, respectively. Among the few empirical 
contributions beyond relative indices, see Blackorby et al. (1981) and Bishop 
et al. (1989). 
(2) See Shorrocks (1980), Blackorby et al. (1981) and, for a survey, Ebert 
(1988). 
(3) See, for example, Foster (1985). 
(4) See Shorroks (1983), Moyes (1987) and Chakravarty (1988). 
(5) Surprisingly enough, Miller (1970), quoted by AC, suggests that '... 
)it is conceivable that a proportionate income increase means more to the 
poor than to the rich'. 
(6) Here and in the following Tables, because of rounding errors not 
all frequency distributions add up to 100 per cent. 
(7) Unfortunately, we lost the answers to this question in the Spanish 
case. 
(8) See also Shorrocks and Foster (1987). 
. ) 
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APPENDIX 1: THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
FIRST PARTc 
In each of the first four questions you are asked to compare two distributions 
of income. Please state which of them you consider to be the more unequally distributed by 
circling A or B. If you consider that both of the distributions have the same inequality, then 
circle both A and B.c 
A = (6,9, 15) B = (12, 18,30) 
A = (6, 9, 15) B = (10, 13, 19) 
A=(6,9,15) B = (14, 18,26) 
A = (6, 9, 15) B = (6,6,9,9, 15, 15) 
In each of the next four questions you are presented with a hypothetical 
change and three possible views about the change, labelled a, b, c. Please circle the letter 
alongside the view that corresponds most closely to your own. 
(5) Suppose we double the 'real income' of each person in a society, when not 
all the initial incomes are equal. 
a. Each person's share remains unchanged, so inequality remains 
unchanged. 
b. Those who had more also get more, so inequality has increased. 
c. After doubling incomes more people have enough money for basic 
r needs, so inequality has fallen. 
'-
In the light of the above, wou1d you want to change your answer to question 1? 
If so, please write your new response -A or B or A and B. 
(6) Suppose we add the same fixed amount to the incomes of each person in a 
society, when not all the initial incomes are equal. 
a. Inequality has fallen because the share of those who had more 
has fallen. 
b. The same amount has been added to every person, so inequality 
remains the same. 
c. Inequality has increased. 
In the light of the above, would you want to change your answer to question 2? 
If so, please write your new response -A or B or A and B. 
(7) Suppose that, when not all the initial incomes are equal, we add an 
amount to the incomes of each person in the following manner: the richer the person 
initially the greater the amount she receives, but the poorer the person the greater is the 
improvement in her relative position (or her share in total income) after the change. 
a. Each rich person's share has fallen, so inequality has fallen. 
b. The rich are richer than before but, on the other hand, the poor 
improve their relative position, so inequality remains unchanged. 
c. The initial ordering from the richest to the poorest person remains 
unchanged and the difference between the highest and the lowest incomes has increased, so 
inequality has increased. 
In the light of the above, would you want to change your answer to question 3? 
If so, please write your new response -A or B or A and B. 
(8) Suppose we replicate a three-person society by merging it with an exact 
copy of itself (so that we now have a society of six people consisting of three sets of 
identical twins). 
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a. The income inequality of the six-person community is the same as 
that of the three-person community because the relative income shares remain unchanged. 
b. The income inequality of the six-person community is less than that 
of the three-person community because in the six-person community there are some people 
who have the same income. 
c. The income inequality of the six-person community is greater than 
that of the three-person community . 
In the light of the above, would you want to change your answer to question 4? 
If so, please write your new response -A or B or A and B. 
SECOND PART 
In each of the next three questions you are asked to compare two distributions 
of income. Please state which of them you consider to be the more unequally distributed by 
circling A or B. If you consider that both of the distributions have the same inequality, then 
circle both A and B. 
(9) A =0,4,7, JO, 13) B =(1, 5,6, 10, 13) 
(10) A =(4,8,9) B=(5,6,10) 
(11) A =(4,7,7,8,9) B =(5, 6, 7,7, 10) 
In each of the next two questions you are presented with a hypothetical 
change and three possible views about the change, labelJed a, b, c. Please circle the letter 
alongside the view that corresponds most closely to your own. 
(12) Suppose we transfer income from a person who has more income to a 
person who has less, without changing anyone else's income. After the transfer the person 
who formerly has more still has more. 
a. Income inequality in this society has fallen. 
b. The relative position of others has also changed as a 
consequence of this transfer. Therefore wc cannot say, a priori, how inequality has changed. 
c. Neither of the above. 
In the light of the above, would you want to change your answer to question 9? 
If so, please write your new response -A or B or A and B. 
(13) Suppose there are two societies, A and B, with the same number of people 
and with the same total income, but with different distributions of income. Society A is now 
merged with C, and society B is merged with C' where C and C' are identical. 
a. The society which had the more unequal income distribution 
before the merger still has the more unequal distribution after the merger. 
b. We can't say which society has the more unequal distribution 
unless we know the exact distributions. 
c. Neither of the above. 
In the light of the above (and your answer to question 10), would you want to 
change your answer to question 11? lf so, please wri te your new response -A or B or A and B. 
REMARKS ON THE DIFFERENCES WITH AC'S QUESTIONNAIRE: 
1. Questions 3 and 7 are new. 2. The numerical distributions in questions 1,2 
and 4 are now different for reasons explained in the text. 3. Question 6.b has been slightly 
rewritten. 4. No comments on the reasons for their answers were asked from the 
respondents. 5. The order of the questions has been modified. 
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SPANISH VERSION 
PRIMERA PARTE 
En las primeras cuatro prcguntas se pide que compare dos distribuciones de 
renta. Por {avor, indique cual de ellas considera Vd. que esta mas desigualmente distribuida 
marcando con un circulo la respuesta A 0 B. Si piensa que ambas tienen la misma 
desigualdad, trace un drculo tanto sobre A como sobre B. 
(1) A =(6,9, 15) B =02, 18,30) 
(2) A=(6,9,15) B =00, 13, 19) 
(3) A =(6,9, 15) B =04, 18,26) 
(4) A =(6, 9, 15) B = (6,6,9,9, IS, 15) 
En las cuatro preguntas siguientes se describe un cambio hipotetico y tres 
opiniones posibles sobre el mismo, identificadas por las 1ctras a, b, c. Por {avor, senale con un 
circulo la letra de la opinion con la que estc Vd. mas de acucrdo. 
(5) Suponga que, a partir de una situacion inicial en que las rentas no son 
iguales, doblamos la renta de cada una de las personas de la sociedad. 
a. Como la participaci6n de todas las personas' en el total permanece 
constante, la desigualdad no varia con cl cambio. 
b. Como se obtienen cantidadcs mayores cuanto mas rico seas, la 
desigualdad ha aumentado. 
c. Como despucs de doblar todas las rentas mas gente tendra suficiente 
dinero para satis{acer sus necesidades basicas, la desigualdad ha disminuido. 
A la luz de esta pregunta, ,desea Vd. cambiar su respuesta a la pregunta 1? En 
ese caso, indique aquf su nueva respuesta: A 6 B 6 Ay B 
(6) Suponga que, a partir de una situaci6n inicial en que las rentas no son 
iguales, af\adimos la misma cantidad {ija alas rentas de cada persona de la sociedad. 
a. La desigualdad ha disminuido porque la participaci6n sobre el total 
de los mas ricos se ha reducido. 
b. Al haberse af\adido la misma cantidad a todo el mundo, la 
desigualdad permanece constante. 
c. La desigualdad ha aumentado. 
Suponga que en lugar de ai1adir deducimos una cantidad {ija de la renta de 
todas las personas. Entonces la desigualdad ... 
a. pcrmanece constante b. aumenta c. disminuye. 
A la luz de esta dobJc pregunta, ,desearia Vd. cambiar su respuesta a la 
pregunta 2? En ese caso, indique aquf su nueva respuesta: A 6 B 6 Ay B 
(7) Suponga que, a partir de una situaci6n inicial en que las rentas no son 
iguales, af\adimos una cantidad a cada persona de la manera siguiente: la cantidad es 
mayor cuanto mas rica sea la persona inicialmente, pero supone un aumento relativo mayor 
para los mas pobres. 
a. Como la situaci6n relativa de 105 mas ricos ha empeorado mientras que ha 
mejorado la de 105 !MS pobres, la desigualdad ha disminuido. 
b. Como por una parte los ricos son mas ricos que antcs pero, por otra, los pobres 
mejoran su posici6n relativa, la desigualdad ha permanecido constante. 
c. Como no se ha alterado la ordenaci6n inicial de pobres a ricos y ha 
aumentado la diferencia entre la renta mas alta y la mas baja, la desigualdad ha 
aumentado. 
A la lu de esta pregunta, ,desea Vd. cambiar su respucsta a la pregunta 3? En 
ese caso, indique aquf su nueva respuesta: A 6 B 6 Ay B 
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(8) Suponga que replicamos un<l sociedad de tres personas anadiendole una 
copia exacta de sf misma (de modo que ahora tenemos una sociedad de seis personas que 
. consiste en tres pares de gemclos idcnticos). 
a. La desigualdad de la rent<l en J<l comunidad de seis personas es la misma 
que en la de tres personas porque las particip<lciones relativas de la renta permanecen 
constantes. 
b. La desigualdad de la rent<l en 1<1 comunidad de seis personas es menor que en 
la de tres porque en la comunidad mayor existcn <llgunas personas que tienen la misma renta. 
c. La desigualdad de la renta en la comunidad de seis personas es mayor que en 
la de tres. 
A la luz de esta pregunta, ,desea Vd. cambiar su respuesta a la pregunta 4? En 
ese caso, indique aquf su nueva respuesta: A 6 B 6 Ay B 
SECUNDA PARTE 
En las tres preguntas siguientes se pide que compare dos distribuciones de 
renta. Por favor, indique cual de ellas considera Vd. que esta IDols desigualmente distribuida 
marcando con un cfrculo la respuest<l A 6 B. Si piensa que ambas tienen la misma 
desigualdad, trace un drculo tanto sobre A como sobre B. 
(9) A =(],4, 7,10,13) B=(],5,6, 10, 13) 
(10) A =(4,8, 9) B =(5,6, 10) 
(11) A =(4,7,7,8,9) B =(5,6,7, 7, 10) 
En las dos preguntas siguientes se describe un cambio hipotetico y varias 
opiniones posibles sobre el mismo, identificad<ls por l<ls 1ctras a, b, C, ••• Por favor, senale 
con un cfrculo la letra de la opinion con l<l que estc Vd. mas de acuerdo. 
(12) Considere un p<lr cU<llquier<l de personas y suponga que transferimos alguna 
renta desde la mas rica a la mas pobre, de m<lIWr<l que la persona que era mas rica 
inicialmente continua siendolo despurs de la tr<lnsferencia. No se altera la renta de nadie 
mas en la sociedad. 
a. La desigualdad de J<l renta h<l disminuido. 
b. La posici6n relativa de los dcmas tambien ha variado como 
consecuencia de esta transferencia. Por t<lnto, no podemos decir a priori c6mo ha variado la 
desigualdad. 
c. No estoy de acuerdo con ninguna de las dos respuestas anteriores. 
A la luz de esta pregunta, ,dese<l Vd. cambiar su respuesta a la pregunta 9? En 
ese caso, escriba aquf su nueva respuest<l: A 0 B 6 Ay B 
(13) Suponga que hay dos sociedades Ay B con el mismo numero de personas y 
con la misma renta total, pero con difcrentes distribuciones de ese total. La sociedad A se une 
a la C, mientras que la sociedad B se une a la C', donde C y C' son identicas. 
a. La sociedad que tenfa la distribuci6n de la renta mas desigual 
antes de la uni6n tiene todavfa la distribuci6n mas desigual despues de la misma. 
b. No podemos decir que sociedad tiene mayor desigualdad a menos 
que conozcamos las distribuciones exactas. 
c. No estoy de acuerdo con ningun<l de las dos respuestas anteriores. 
A la luz de esta pregunta (y su rcspucsta a la pregunta 10), ,desea Vd. cambiar 
su respuesta a la pregunta 11? En ese caso, escrib<l aquf su nueva respuesta: A 6 B 6 Ay B 
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APPENDIX 2: DEFINITIONS OF CONSISTENCY 
DEFINITION 1. Invariance issue: questions ql, q2, q3, q5, q6, q7 
For the maximum degree, a respondent must answer all questions consistently, i.e.: 
ql q2 q3 q5 q6 qJ 
Relative A&B A A a a a 
Absolute B A&B B b b c 
Intermediate B A A&B b a b 
Extreme-righ t A A A c a a 
Extreme-left B B B b c c 
For good, i) all AC questions -ql, q2, q5 and q6- consistently in the above sense, ii) the 
three numerical ones plus the associated verb<ll, or iii) the three verbal ones plus the 
associated numerical. For acceptable, i) ql, q2 plus the associated verbal, ;jl q5, q6 plus the 
associated numerical, iii) the three numerical, or iv) the three verbal. For minimum, i) ql and 
q2, or ii) q5 and q6. For unacceptable, the rest, including ql and q5, q2 and q6, or q3 and q7 
correctly. 
DEFINITION 2. Population principle: questions q4, q8 
For the maximum degree, a respondent must answer both questions consistently, i.e.: 
q4 q8 
Agrement A&B a 
Disagreement (Up) B c 
Disagreement (Down) A b 
All the rest are unaccepta ble. 
DEFINITION 3. Transfer principle: questions q9, q15 
For the maximum degree, a respondent must answer both questions consistently, i.e.: 
q9 q15 
Agrement A a 
Disagreement - Type 1 B c 
Disagreement - Type 2 A&B c 
For acceptable, the above answers to q9 and answer 'b' to q15. All the rest are unacceptable. 
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